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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF MOROCCO

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All diplomatic relations of any land are the joint result of its geographical and historical formula. These remain unchanged through the centuries to a degree little appreciated by those who arbitrarily divide history into periods. Morocco is an isolated tract with no entrance on the Mediterranean world save at the straits of Gibraltar. For Morocco's whole life rests upon a light rain fall of not over 15 or 20 inches, over the plains and over the mountainous tracts from 5 to 10 inches more. The practical result is a sparse population in the plains but a large product of hard spring wheat, including some of the best varieties known and recently introduced into our West with great success; and a larger population in the region over an elevation of from 1200 to 1500 feet, which includes, roughly speaking, four-fifths of the area of Morocco. The mountain population is Berber or Libyan in origin, in isolated valleys preserving a rugged independence, practicing the arts of leather making, pottery, iron and copper with an unusual skill and furnishing handicraft men for the large interior cities, all of which are at an elevation of over a thousand feet. The plains are occupied by a wandering Arab population with occasional villages of mountaineer folk who have sought the plains. The coast cities possess a mingling of all these elements. The fighting vigor of the land resides therefore in the mountains, its source of food supply principally in the plains. Whatever cultivation and settled rule exists is to be found in the cities.

The historical formula of Morocco rests upon successive migrations north of the tribes of the Atlas under one leader and another through all the last thousand years of recorded history, each dynasty coming up from the south, each losing its power in the cities of the north, the stronger in their onset carrying their power across the straits over Spain.

Its geographical formula is familiar to you all, with the same distribution of rain fall between plain and mountainous regions, the same division of the handicraft arts in mountainous Spain of the north and of a 15 inch rainfall, the same source of food supply in the wheat fields of the elevated plateau, and the same historical succession of eruptions across the Pyrenees which have furnished a ruling race for the Iberian substratum of the peninsula, Gallic, Roman, Visi-Goth, Provencal, and so on, through the reigning houses of Spain, Aragon, Navarre, Hapsburg, Bourbon.

The first great onset on Spain from Africa came under Punic Semitic generals, of whom the greatest was Hannibal, who owed all his line, the only line which ever destroyed the Roman legion in the open field, to the mountaineers of north Africa. Under Rome forays from north Africa began, as inscriptions in the reign of Marcus Aurelius show. After many lesser invasions, they culminated in the first conquest in the ninth century, and again of Moorish mountaineers led by Semitic Arab generals. The next wave of conquest came under Yusuf Taschfyn Al Mohades, who came from beyond the Atlas and entered Spain in the same century which saw William enter the British islands and the wide redistribution of power which accompanied the maritime or semi-maritime expeditions of the eleventh century. The next great wave, Al Mohades, followed in the fourteenth century, and the last, omitting lesser movements in Morocco, was headed by the Filali sharifs, the founders of the present dynasty, who came, like all their predecessors in the conquest of Morocco, from south of the Atlas to occupy the two great divisions of Morocco, the southern which circles about Morocco City, and the northern, which has its twin capitals of Fez and Mequinez.

This sovereignty however through all the thousand years in which it has existed under one family or another has never presented itself to any Mohammedan, Arab or Berber, in those terms of exact, complete and exclusive rule which are the product of Roman and European law. Morocco is almost alone among Moslem lands in having been converted, after the brief occupation of the coast by Musa, by mission-

ary effort. The descendant of Mohammed, Idris, grandson of Ali, who reached Morocco in the ninth century and founded Fez, carried on a peaceful propaganda. Exactly as in Germany it is possible to distinguish between the regions won by the sword for Christianity and those acquired by conversion by the circumstance that in the latter old heathen shrines remain re-baptized and changed, so in Morocco, after passing the narrow litoral which fronts on the Mediterranean and going south of Fez, one finds the perpetual proof that the earlier shrines were changed to Moslem saints without shock. The whole land is therefore essentially Moslem. Its village tribes, even villages of the plain, and the whole body of dwellers gathered in the cities, do not look upon the Sultan as sovereign in our jural sense. He is instead, being as he always has been through the female line from the beginning under all dynasties of the blood and descent of Mohammed, the head of Moslems for the purpose of conducting war with infidels, preserving a general order, and acting as the religious head of the nation. This carries with it a wide exercise of despotic power ruthlessly exercised. But this is incidental. In theory, for any man learned in the strait sect of Mohammedan law which obtains in Morocco, the Malekite interpretation of the Koran, believers are equal; they pay a common contribution to the makhzen, or treasurer. This is in the hand of the descendant of the Prophet, who for the time being has been selected by the acclamation of the Mosque and the use of his name in prayer in the great sanctuaries of the land as Sultan, Caliph and keeper of the treasury of the faithful, commander of the believers, Emir el Moumenin. It was but the other day that a sultan was deposed by the ancient prescribed method of a man rising among the worshipers in the great mosque in Fez, leading in prayer, and when the prayer for the ruler came, substituting a new name. When the believers around joined in the supplication, the change was legally made and accepted by a proscriptive election. For Moslem law is almost alone in furnishing from the beginning a settled method by which a change of ruler can be made.

All diplomatic relations therefore, down to the capture

of Granada and the final conquest of Andalous, were conducted on even terms, wholly lacking, as the various treaties and documents show, in the diplomatic relations between the Sublime Porte and the Christian nations about its boundaries who for four centuries watched what seemed to be the invincible advancing tide of Turkish conquest. Rapine, massacre, battle and war went on through all the period, but there was between Christian and Moslem a mutual relation which never existed in the eastern Mediterranean. These even handed diplomatic relations were suddenly and perpetually changed by the merciless persecution which constitutes a little known chapter of that great period of reaction when Spain led in rolling back into central Europe the tide of Protestantism, and in the south the remains of past Mohammedan invasion. There is a sense—not always clearly remembered—in which this movement was in no fanciful interpretation a re-conquest by the great administrative machine bequeathed by Rome of territories which the northern tribes had occupied in Europe and the southern invasion had seized in the Iberian peninsula. The 16th century in Spain, from the time when the first decrees against the Moriscoes were pronounced until their final expulsion by Philip IV and Larma, his minister, in 1618, was marked by the breach of treaties, the disregard of solemn covenants and capitulations, the ruthless barbarity, the pitiless persecution, and at last the summary deportation of nearly half a million men, women and children from Spain to north Africa, including among them some Christians who had the pitiable fate of being driven from Spain because of their Moorish descent and stoned to death in north Morocco because they refused to deny the Christ whose followers had persecuted and driven them from homes held longer than any American settlement. This century of persecution running through all the fifteen hundreds, attended on both sides by the stream of savage barbarity, of prisoners becoming slaves, no quarter being given, every Moor and every Christian in fight remembering the torture, the barbarous torture, with which his fellows had been treated by the

enemy, dug the deep pit of measureless hate which separated and still separates Moslem and Christian in northwestern Africa. For nearly two hundred years 1600 to 1800 the entire diplomatic relations between European powers and the varying authorities which held the coast of Morocco and preserved a precarious sovereignty in the interior, were embraced in treaties which provided for the release of Christian captives held in slavery at the various ports of Morocco, as well as the other north African states. These various treaties, all on the same line, all providing for ransom, were fostered long after they were really needed, because it was the open and avowed policy of the maritime nations of the Mediterranean, led by England, to discourage any flag but their own by making the sea perilous to all other flags through the frank recognition of Moorish piracy. There are still, near Mequinez, whole villages inhabited by the descendants of Christian captives long since become Moslem. One who mixes much with the Moor in the market place with a knowledge of the language is perpetually coming across names in the cities which recall this origin. They have long since been lost in the population save for an occasional agnomen, for while the Spanish Christian visited the penalty of Moorish birth upon the convert to the third and fourth generation of those who believed and worshiped with him, the Mohammedan gives to all the rights of Moslem citizenship the newest convert.

Our own diplomacy a century ago and our own prowess, repeating under another flag the daring deeds of the blood of those who sailed with Drake when he fought forts with ships and burned vessels in the harbors of north Africa, accomplished a great change by which all the north African ports, including Morocco, surrendered piracy and guaranteed the safety of peaceful vessels. Yet even I in early boyhood sailed on an American clipper vessel provided with two little guns, the crew being called to quarters and trained in their use because of the possibility of being picked up during some calm by Riffian pirates off the coast of north Morocco, while there is probably more than one in

my audience who remember like myself meeting those on Cape Cod who had made their scanty contribution to ransom American sailors captive in Morocco.

With the treaties negotiated in the early part of the 19th century abolishing piracy there came the opening of the present and concluding chapter of diplomatic relations with Morocco, begun a century ago with the treaties which Mulai Soliman (1794-1822), a ruthless and powerful conqueror of the old type, negotiated with the different European powers. From Morocco Christian residents had been as completely excluded as from any central Asiatic khanates. A periodical trip under guard by a European ambassador to the Court of the Sultan was the only travel permitted to a European. The residence of foreign representatives was jealously restricted to Tangiers, and in the coast cities particularly at Mogador and Mazazan there was a little quarter on the water side walled and gated which precisely repeated conditions of the Hongs in Canton and elsewhere, through which Chinese trade was carried on in the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. But centuries of experience had made the Moorish administration familiar with the principles of extrterritoriality as embraced in the capitulations. All the Jewish communities in Morocco, which began with the first dawn of Mohammedanism lived apart under their own laws. The site of the great mosque at Fez was bought from a Jew, following the example of the Prophet himself. The treaties with Europe continued therefore the principle of extrterritoriality or accepted it as a part of the common law of foreign contact. This was the easier because there still existed and exists in Morocco that personal jurisdiction which in mediæval times was universal all over Europe and guided the trader from the little place on the Thames which still carries the name of the Hansiatic League in some of its streets to the Arab Khans in Chinese ports, preceding by centuries the later warehouses of European merchants.

Diplomatic relations began in the modern sense therefore with Morocco under the same general lines of international law which guided them in negotiation with the Sublime

Porte. Down to our own day these conditions have remained singularly unchanged. Exactly as Austria secured from Turkey the privilege of Austrian mails in 1794, so that all the Powers have their post offices in Turkey, the mails of Morocco are in foreign hands so far as any exist. Exactly as the foreign trader has the advantage of his own contracts and courts over the native in the Levant, he has had this also in the sheriffian empire. To one who had travelled in Turkey as a boy in the fifties, there was when travelling in Morocco something similar in the respect paid to the European before the recent revolts, which have practically ended European travel in Morocco for the last eight or ten years, to the respect shown for the European 50 years ago in outlying parts of Turkey. But Morocco, unlike Turkey, has never been able to organise a new administration, a disciplined army, or a successful sovereignty. The structure of the kingdom already described made this difficult, and Morocco, owing to the fiery wall of persecution which separated the two races and religions in the sixteenth century, never enjoyed that intermingling and interpenetration of European ideas which has existed in the Ottoman Empire, fortunate in never having to face the mercies of the Holy Inquisition, to embitter the relations of Moslem and Nazarene. For half a century, until in 1844 the Prince de Joinville bombarded Tangiers and Mogador, Morocco was as completely out of all European contact as it was in the 17th and 18th centuries. The French treaty of September 10, 1844, began the train of negotiations which ended in the European conference of Algeciras and the present diplomatic situations. For the first time a boundary between Morocco and its eastern neighbor Algeria was delimited; Morocco agreed to give France jurisdiction over certain tribes; and the treaty left a broad area uncharted with provisions in regard to wandering tribes and desert villages (kessour). These last provisions were the basis of the declaration of August 5, 1890, by which the British and French governments, Article Two, recognized the sphere of influence of France to the south of her Mediterranean possessions up to a line from Saye on the Niger and Barrava

on Lake Chad drawn in such a manner to comprise in the sphere of action of the English Niger Company all that fairly belonged to the kingdom of Sokoto and leave all above to France. These, joined to the early and ancient rights which France had in one of the very first of its colonies in Senegal, enclosed Morocco in the great curve of French territory which begins at the northern edge of Senegal and ends today in the occupation by France—temporary in name but permanent in character—of Oudja. All enclosed by the right angle of which one side was Algeria and the other Senegal was Morocco. With the exception of the territory claimed by Spain on the Gold River (Rio Oro), latitude $23^{\circ} 36''$ north, longitude $9^{\circ} 49''$ west; at Angra-decrintra, $23^{\circ} 6''$ north, longitude $10^{\circ} 01''$ west; and at Western Bay, latitude $20^{\circ} 51''$, longitude $10^{\circ} 56''$, as specified in the Spanish notification of January 29, 1885, accepted by England January 28, 1885, Ceuta, the solitary remnant of the expedition of Charles V, confirmed to Spain at the same time as Joinville treaty by Spanish treaties of October 7, 1844, and May 6, 1845. Between 1844 and 1890, in which the position of Morocco as enclosed in the enciente of French possessions had been accomplished, a period just short of half a century, a profound change had taken place in the character of the relations between Morocco and Europe. A succession of strong sovereigns had established a reasonable degree of peace and order in the interior of the empire up to an elevation of 1500 or 2000 feet, where the territory of the mountain tribes remained little controlled by the Sultan and unentered by Europeans, save as an occasional venture—some traveler crossed this unmarked boundary at his own risk. But in all the ports in the territory around them and in the trade of the interior cities, the possession of the European trader of protection, consular trial and the ability to enforce contracts through the ruthless Moorish governors by paying for it had destroyed the trade of the Moorish merchant. It had transferred to European hands very considerable areas of land and a still larger share of the productive agriculture in cattle and in grain. Any native who could secure a partner could afford to pay heavily for the

privilege if he had large properties, and there were plenty of Europeans living in the coast towns who derived a very fair support by simply lending their names as partners. Jewish traders took advantage of this with a celerity unpracticed by the Moor. The cheap manufactures of Europe destroyed bit by bit all local industry. Moslem families which had held their property and possessions untouched through an unbroken line, often of sacred descent, literally of a thousand years of known and recorded ancestry, found themselves reduced to beggary. A Spanish colony outnumbering the Moorish population appeared in Tangiers. Through all the coast of Morocco every new house and every sign of prosperous trade or farming represented some foreign partnership. Foreign diplomacy had for its chief task the collection of debts but too often fraudulent, the protection of contracts against the whole spirit and intent of the extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the aid and comfort of imports under a low tariff created by treaty and incapable of revision, which destroyed all local industries, precisely similar to those which existed in the mountains of Portugal, which had the happier fortune of being protected by a high tariff until their final collapse has come in the last five or ten years, leading to the revolution now in progress. The village tribes protected themselves from all this by their prowess, their fighting power, and the swiftness with which they re-armed themselves—the Remington with its ounce ball being their favorite weapon, a circumstance aided by the steadiness with which some of our consular agents used their inviolable position to smuggle arms by day and by night into Morocco in violation of our treaties and in defiance of Moslem law. Once Spain, in 1859, made a vain effort to acquire conquest in northern Morocco. The treaty of Tetuan, April 26, 1860, ended this vain effort, whose failure was due to the same significant circumstance which brought to an ignominious end the hostilities in 1893 between Melilla and the Moors of the neighborhood, and the more recent “war” of two years ago. In each instance the returns of Spanish casualties, with their very large proportion of officers and their small proportion of privates, told their story to one

versed in the interpretation of military reports. Under the treaty of 1859 a war indemnity of twenty million dollars was paid; under that of 1893, four million dollars, and under that of 1908, a sum still to be adjusted the only return which has been received for a prodigal expenditure by Spain of—one cannot say treasure, for the money was all borrowed—but of obligations to pay, and of heavy loss in battle and worse loss by disease due to the unspeakable neglect of sanitary precautions. Every military experience around Morocco on the Algerian frontier under Marshal Bugeaud in the three Spanish wars and at Casa Blanca two years ago has convinced every military man that the conquest of Morocco would be one of the most difficult military tasks. No European general would think of undertaking it without a force of at least a hundred thousand men, and twice this number would be engaged first and last before the task was completed.

When in 1890 under the direction of Lord Salisbury there began that wide delimitation of African possessions which saved the same devastating war over Africa which had been fought by Europe over the Americas and Asia, Morocco was unnoticed in international agreement save for the French declaration and acceptance already noted. Spain was the odd exception of the treaty in regard to Cape Spartel to which our own government was a party, May 31, 1868—committing itself in the treaty to various rights, responsibilities, and expenditure which only need to be extended to constitute a precedent for any acquisition of territory anywhere for almost any purpose. In addition a treaty—March 13, 1895—was negotiated between Great Britain and Morocco under which, in order to complete the unchallenged encircling of Moorish empire by France, the British government agree to the purchase by the Moorish government of the property of the Northwest African Company at Terfaya, better known as Cape Juby. This treaty recognized the land between Wad Graa and Bojador as belonging to Morocco. The principle of this treaty and its recognition of Moorish sovereignty over a wide stretch of territory where no Moorish power was exerted were the basis of the decision of the Eng-

lish courts in deciding that the *SS. Tourmaline* and the Sutrobe Venture Trading Company had no right to trade with a portion of the Moorish coast in full possession of local tribes but forbidden territory so far as the sheriffian administration was concerned. This group of treaties, including France, Spain, England and Morocco, between 1890 and 1895, had established for the three countries the principle that the entire coast down to Senegal, with the Spanish exception noted, was under Moorish sovereignty and that the French boundary in the interior merged with that of Morocco or, where it did not directly impinge on territory claimed by the Moorish sultan, was separated from it by tribes which France was at liberty to take whenever it desired.

This continuous diplomatic attitude had existed from the treaty of 1844 to the treaty of 1895 as far as the three countries were concerned, of which one, France, was the only European power bordering on Morocco, one, Spain, was the European power which had had the longest relations with the empire, and one, Great Britain, practically monopolised the trade of Moorish ports. Nothing appeared more certain in the diplomatic relations of the Mogul empire than its ultimate acquisition, at first under a directorate and later under annexation by the French Republic. In preparation therefore France diligently subsidised tribes on its border, gave its aid and countenance to the most conspicuous of Moslem ecclesiastical potentates in north Africa, the Sheriff of Wazan, and educated his sons in Algeria, giving them commissions in the Algerian service in the expectation of furnishing a pretender. They suffered from the usual effect of a European education on Moslem youth, but when a pretender appeared 10 years ago in the mountains bordering on Algeria, Bouhamara, who so narrowly escaped seizing power in Morocco and was executed this year at Fez, his payments were made in freshly minted French gold for arms and supplies which mysteriously appeared. As a French minister at Tangier once smilingly said when questioned about it, this was "owing to the well known confidence of the north African tribes in the purity of French coinage."

The rest of the Moslem Mediterranean world had by

successive steps passed under the joint guardianship of Europe. It was an accepted principle of international law that no change of territory, not even if it came after a victorious war in the Treaty of San Stephano, could take place without the consent of Europe, and a European conference was necessary to determine any new stage. This began for Turkey when the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was challenged. It was accepted for Egypt from the days of Mohammed Ali. Even the conquest of Algiers needed European acceptance. The transfer of Tunis was the fruit of a secret agreement of France with Germany, which came later to be the subject of mutual compacts. This experience of the ill feeling awakened by the failure to consider European relations was a warning that any other change in the Mediterranean would meet with protest. Morocco had been excluded from this horizon. The long tangle of despatches, conventions, treaties and mutual protests which had attended the exercise of extraterritoriality in the empire under prescriptive right rather than the precise regulations which established it in Turkey led to the Madrid Conference in 1880, in which this country was for the first time allied with Europe in the affairs of Morocco. In the Madrid Conference general rules were laid down as to the exercise of extraterritoriality in Morocco. But this dealt solely with the subject as it related to those resident in Morocco. It had no bearing upon the international and diplomatic relations of the empire. This, it was believed, could be settled by the joint agreement of France, Spain and England. Germany however early began to interfere. As soon as the sultan, Mulai el Hasid, died in 1894—it is believed by many that are well informed that a cable despatch from the German emperor prevented France from carrying out its intention of seating the descendant of Sheriff of Wasan on the throne. While no official proof exists it is so generally believed and so well accredited that I do not think that anyone questions that the succession in 1894 was kept in the present family by the interference of the Kaiser. The accession of the new sovereign, Abdul Aziz, was used in 1894 and 1895 to collect damages from the Moorish government on behalf of German subjects by summary

means, which included a Dutch-German demonstration in the waters of Tangiers, bitterly resented by France and criticised by the two French papers which spoke most directly for the *Coeur de Lion* in terms which led to the prompt threat of the use of force by Germany in the official press of that empire. For nearly ten years 1895–1905 two contrary policies went on in the empire. Germany extended its trade rapidly, overtaking that of England, multiplied its consular agents, gave its ministry in Tangier a new importance, and encouraged the travel and exploration of Germans throughout the empire. German scientific journals teemed with papers upon the country, which rapidly made them the chief source of opinion upon a subject which had long been exclusively held by French and English explorers. France on the other hand steadily continued to extend its frontier, occupied in 1901 Igli and Tuat, holding one of the great caravan routes out of Morocco to the southeast, and in 1903 an agreement between France, Spain and England provided for a Moorish debt, of which ten million pesetas was yielded to Spain, fifty million francs to France, and England made a party to the transaction under which France was to have the right to collect Moorish customs in case there was a default in the interest, which was reasonably certain. There instantly followed over the entire Moorish empire a series of outbreaks which made roads even two days' journey out of Tangiers dangerous and closed much of south Morocco to European travelers, though German merchants still passed to and fro on the coast between Morocco City or Fez without challenge. For two years longer these opposing theories of the position of Morocco continued. Germany, by one accident and another, asserted its independence of all agreements among the three powers which had so long monopolised the diplomatic relations of Morocco, and France continued to act as the French foreign minister declared, as a country which had "particular" and exclusive rights in the empire. The German theory had on its side the course of events in the East during the last century. The French theory was supported by a related series of acts and facts and agreements from 1844 to 1905, which in the opinion of all English

comment the English government had placed Morocco completely under French influence. Of the bitter and energetic antagonism felt throughout Morocco in regard to this theory and policy of France there can be no question whatever. Ignorant as most Moors seem to the passing traveler, those who know the East are aware that the fact that a man cannot read or write does not change the strength of his brain, and a complete lack of acquaintance with all modern science may co-exist in a ruler or administrator, governor or minister, with a clear and statesmanlike conception of the risks which any course will have for his own country. This is familiar to us in mediæval history, but it is almost impossible for the average modern observer to realise that the same phenomenon exists today in all oriental lands like Morocco.

All Morocco seethed with opposition over the debt of 1903. The Pretender carried his tribal levies up to the gates of Fez. Rais Uli, who captured during his power all nationalities but the German, held the north of Morocco. Following the historical precedents of the past, the elder son of the Sultan, who had failed to secure the succession and had been banished to a distant town beyond the Atlas, rose as Pretender and marching from the southern part of Africa was aided at every turn by the German merchants of Fez. Every tribe asserted its petty independence and every petty lord ceased to send tribute to the capital. Morocco was not only plunged into hopeless and hapless disorder, but the fighting spirit of the land was aroused and it became clearer than ever that the peaceful usurpature which M. Delcassé had promised France was wholly impracticable.

At this moment, in July, 1905, the Kaiser uttered his memorable words at Tangier and dramatically asserted German policy. There is a passage in Kinglake's "Crimea" in which he points out how one great general and another has turned the tide of battle by suddenly appearing at the critical moment so far within the apparent lines of his enemy that their defeat and headlong retreat was brought about by the spectacle. A similar keen sense for the center of the world's stage and the extent to which diplomacy is a matter of senti-

ment guided the German Emperor when he suddenly asserted on Tangiers the German right to share in the disposition of Morocco. At no time was there any reason to suppose that Germany expected seriously to control Morocco, though a port may have been in mind. But it was easy, by a German loan to the Sultan, by clandestine aid to Mulai Hafed on his march from the south, by contract secured for works in Tangier, by local intrigue in Casa Blanca, and finally by forcing the Algeciras Convention, to make the acquisition of Morocco by France a source of weakness, expense, and loss, instead of gain and advantage.

In the conflict which had come, in which neither side cared for the principle in the case, in which the ethics of international acquisition were on the side of France and the broad policy of international action on the side of Germany final success was certain to rest with the power which at the last resort was willing to mobilise its army in order to secure its end. When this became clear in the autumn of 1905, the fall of Combes and Delcassé was certain and the defeat of France. Taking diplomatic advantage of the Conference of 1880 in which Germany was represented, Germany insisted upon a conference which was first to be held in Berlin. Spain, which has had the dubious advantage of having all conferences in regard to Morocco held within its territory, succeeded with some difficulty in securing the assembly at Algeciras, selected so that the presence of a conference at Madrid should not give moral support to Spain in Morocco. The full history of the conference at Algeciras yet remains to be written. The United States had come conspicuously forward in rescuing Perdicaris, captured by Rais Uli, surrender only effected when France found itself face to face with the possibility of the use of force by the United States in Morocco. In the conference at Algeciras the American representative, by temperament and personal relations in sympathy with monarchical and not republican Europe, played an important part in the adjustment, which was a substantial defeat for France. The real issue at Algeciras was not as to details but as to whether France should appear alone in the task of pacifying and developing Morocco, or whether France

should be only one of several powers with equal powers, with equal rights, speaking for revolt. In a country like Morocco diplomatic control rests with power over the rational treasury and occupation of the national ports and customs. The new Morocco debt service was divided between the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain, the Bank of France, and the Bank of Germany, with extra shares for those French bankers who had advanced the previous loan whose protocol provided that all future loans to Morocco should pass through French hands. This gave France a majority in the Commission but it gave Germany the opportunity for interference, an interference at once made visible by the appearance of German officers to drill the Sultan's army, by a small loan, by mining concessions, and by a contract in Tangier. Morocco narrowly escaped massacre in the outburst over the proposed French control in every port where Europeans dwelt, and in Tangier alone there are Spanish, Italian, and foreigners of every nationality, a population between eight and ten thousand living as completely under its own laws as a foreign settlement at Shanghai. The Convention of Algeciras agreed upon a gendarmerie which Spain was to command near its own scanty holdings, which France and Spain were to hold at Tangier and France along the coast. Germany was here excluded, a victory for France in point of detail, but this exclusion still rendered it possible for Germany to obstruct the organization of this force. A long tangle of negotiation followed. On July 31, 1907, there came a trivial riot at Casa Blanca, preceded by the murder of Dr. Marchand in Morocco City, the French representative, which offered an opportunity for France to act. The needless brutality with which Casa Blanca was shelled was a massacre out of all proportion, more criminal than the nine lives which were sacrificed in a street brawl. Nothing could have been worse for France than to have been forced to occupy Casa Blanca first with the joint French and Spanish army and later with the French Algerian force alone. The cost has been heavy, the prodigious difficulty of any operations in Morocco has been exposed to French public opinion, always opposed to military

hazards. The work of carrying out the Algeciras Convention has been indefinitely postponed.

The diplomatic relations of Morocco close therefore with France so situated that it is difficult for it to withdraw from Casa Blanca and impossible for it to advance. Moorish sentiment has been embittered. The Sultan regards Germany as his friend. England, which yielded to France, has lost in position and prestige. Meanwhile the wretched land, which has lost what little order it possessed, has had its foreign trade destroyed, its opportunity for development checked, and the misery which broods over all its area adds another to the pitiful chapters which have attended the loss of Mohammedan power since the Biscayan provinces were first freed from the invader eight centuries ago.

This conception of Moorish sovereignty has confused all diplomatic relations which on the side of the Europeans have always insisted as regarding the Sultan of Morocco as in the European sense "sovereign," while all the people of Morocco look upon his rights, however extreme and arbitrary they may be in their exercise, as limited by the purpose for which he exists. Nor is there a village in the Atlas which for an instant would accept the view that any sultan of Morocco could cede the soil upon which it stood.

This gap between the conceptions of both systems of civilization was widened by the circumstances which attended the ebb of Mohammedan power in the west Mediterranean. The advance of Moslem power in eastern Europe began with the Ottoman Empire in the thirteenth century, reached its culmination in the siege of Vienna, when in the churches of Boston and New York thanksgiving was said for the defeat of the Turk, and has continued its ebb for the last two hundred years. The culmination of Moslem conquest in the western Mediterranean was reached at the battle of Tours in the ninth century, reached the full height of organization in the eleventh, and beginning to ebb, had disappeared in the same year in which Columbus discovered America. The ebb in the east Mediterranean has been accompanied in general, though not always, by the steady reflux march of the Moslem population going on today in Crete, in Bul-

garia, and in the territory ceded to Greece thirty years ago, ever since the white-crossed flag was raised there. For four centuries from the beginning of Christian conquest in the 11th century to its triumph in the 15th, no such migration took place in Spain. The system of "capitulations" under which Christian races lived in the Ottoman Empire has been exercised in the eastern Mediterranean almost exclusively for the protection of those of our own faith. In all of Spain, from Galicia south, after four centuries, in which the Christian had lived under Moslem rulers with treaties and agreements which matched the capitulations of Mahmud, and having of course a far earlier origin, then in the first place granted by Moslem rulers to Christian subjects, were succeeded by precisely similar capitulations and agreements granted by Christian rulers to Moslem subjects. Down to the end of the fifteenth century all the coast and interior cities of Morocco, practically all the territory of Spain was familiar with the spectacle of Moslems living at peace under Christian rulers and of Christians living at peace under Moslem rulers, so that even cities which half a century ago were visited with difficulty by Europeans, like Morocco City, had tolerably large colonies of Europeans, as late as the 17th century of whom one for a brief season was John Smith, the head of the Virginian colony, who lived for a while in Morocco City in his wandering life.